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Building a Tatar elite
Language and national schooling in Kazan
AURORA ALVAREZ VEINGUER
University of Granada, Spain
HOWARD H. DAVIS
University of Wales, Bangor, UK
ABSTRACT Tatarstan, a bi-cultural region in the Russian Federation, has been
experiencing a significant revival of Tatar language, culture and ethnic identities
during the post-Soviet period. This article examines the significance of language
policy in schools, and elite Tatar schools in particular, for this Tatar renaissance. It
describes the political context and institutional setting and uses qualitative research
data to analyse ethnic identification among pupils, parents and teachers. It shows
that language has central importance in the Tatar schools and is treated as essential
to what it means to be Tatar. Till now, the ‘Tatarstan model’ of partial autonomy
within the Russian Federation has successfully accommodated ethnic diversity.
However, asymmetries between ‘national’ education in Tatar schools and predomi-
nantly Russian education in non-Tatar schools have potential to generate tensions,
as the republic of Tatarstan develops its policies for interethnic relations, religion
and culture.
KEY WORDS ethnicity ● language policy ● post-Soviet ● Russia ● schools ●
Tatarstan
INTRODUCTION
Since the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the republic of Tatarstan in the
Russian Federation has been experiencing a significant renaissance of Tatar
ethnicity and culture. This is reflected in formal public policies and
procedures, as well as through informal rejections of previous Russian or
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Soviet identifications. The 1992 constitution defined Tatarstan as a multi-
ethnic republic, with two official languages, Russian and Tatar.1 The largest
ethnic groups are Tatars and Russians, and they correspond approximately
to the two main confessions, Muslim and Orthodox. Tatarstan promotes
itself as an example of interethnic stability in the post-Soviet context and is
widely recognized as such. The society has many prominent bi-cultural
features. For example, inside the walls of the Kremlin in the capital city of
Kazan, the coexistence of a new mosque and an ancient cathedral is
typically presented as a symbol of the harmonious relations between the
different ethnic and religious groups in the republic.
This article reports on a study of one aspect of these developments,
namely Tatar language and education.2 Previous research on Tatarstan
includes surveys of politics (McAuley, 1997), ethnicity (Drobizheva et al.,
1996), business (McCann, 2005), religion (Daucé, 2003; Mohammatshin,
2001), media and language (Davis et al., 2000). Schooling has received
less attention, despite its continuing high status in line with Soviet
tradition and its prominence in the cultural policies of the Tatar elite. The
research presented here highlights two aspects of the developing ethnic
identifications among pupils attending Tatar schools. First, it shows the
priority of language as a sign of belonging. It is, of course, a ‘contingent
marker’ (May, 2001: 10) because the relationship between language and
ethnicity is not fixed. But we will show that it is more than just another
sign among many. Second, it indicates a potential problem in the asym-
metry of the language policy that encourages young Tatars to develop a
unified ‘national’ identity, combining language, ethnicity, religion and
other elements, which is not matched by the policy as it affects young
Russians, who neither expect to speak Tatar nor are likely to express their
identities in these terms.
The Tatars are a Turkic people whose ethnic origins are still the subject
of scholarly debate. The Kazan Tatars were established in the central Volga
region by the 13th century (Hanauer, 1996; Rorlich, 2000). The history of
the language reflects the changing influences on Tatar culture. Until 1860,
the language amongst Volga-Ural Tatars was old-Tatar, with Arabic and
Persian influences (Iskhakov, 1997a). In 1927, the Latin alphabet (Yanalif )
was officially recognized as the Tatar language alphabet, replacing the
Arabic (Iskhakov, 1997a: 25). However, as a result of Russification policies,
the use of Latin script was replaced by Cyrillic at the end of the 1930s. More
recently, the effect of perestroika was to launch an active struggle by nation-
alists and Tatars from the Soviet power structure for the rebirth of Tatar
national identity, culture and language. National schools were reopened,
where Tatar language became the medium of teaching, and Tatar language
classes were promoted once again, with the aim of returning to the same
conditions of active Tatar cultural and language development that had
occurred at the beginning of the 20th century.
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On 15 February 1994, after three years of negotiations, Kazan and
Moscow signed a bilateral treaty that was politically and symbolically
crucial for Tatarstan’s future. The treaty was acclaimed as an historic symbol
that Moscow and Kazan had reached a peaceful accommodation that
allowed a substantial amount of autonomy to the republic. The concept of
a ‘Tatarstan Model’ was born on 3 October 1994 when President Mintimir
Shaimiev visited Harvard University (Iskhakov, 1995). According to his
speech, it is a concept that involves a harmonious relationship between
Moscow and Kazan, reducing political conflict between the centre and
region, maintaining cooperation, and simultaneously allowing Tatarstan a
degree of financial and juridical independence. The notion of a ‘Tatarstan
Model’3 is usually presented as a positive contrast to other regions, especi-
ally in the Caucasus, where claims to sovereignty have led to violent
confrontations and conflicts. It remains a model of continuous adaptation
and compromise in a search for balance with Moscow. Tatarstan is atypical
within Russia because of the high proportion of non-Russians in a region
that lies geographically, economically and politically within the heart of the
federation.4
The idiosyncrasies of the political arena should not be underestimated.
Politics in Tatarstan is characterized by a quasi-feudal system and a Tatar
ethnopolitical monopoly with virtually no opposition (Löwenhardt, 1997:
133; Sagitova, 1998: 65).5 There has been a consistent trend towards the
Tatarization of the governmental elite (Gorenburg, 1999; McAuley, 1997:
87). The legislative, executive and judicial powers in Tatarstan are in the
hands of a small and tightly knit group, the clientele of President Shaimiev
(Löwenhardt, 1997: 133), or what is known in other circles as Shaimiev’s
clan or the khanate (McCann, 2005: 52). However, according to
Mukhariamov, it is an oversimplification to talk about ethnocracy and
better in the context of Tatarstan to refer to ‘agrobureaucracy’.6 The
agrobureaucracy is a group of people with a shared culture and model of
behaviour, from rural backgrounds, who made their career during the
Soviet period in the rural environment. Generally, they come from veteri-
nary, pedagogical or agrarian institutes, though a lawyer could be equally
eligible. Tatar is usually their first language but they all speak Russian
because it is essential for interaction in the cities. Their strong social
networks provide support for political careers and encourage group
cohesion. They are the main promoters of Tatar national education and
closely involved in the running of Tatar national schools (gymnásias).7 The
promotion of Tatar language in the republic is one of their central
ambitions.
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THE EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM IN CONTEXT:
NATIONAL GYMNÁSIAS
Schooling is a powerful mechanism of language maintenance and
promotion, and it can be an effective reproductive apparatus and trans-
mitter of specific cultures and identities. ‘It is, in a large part, through their
schools that ethnic communities define themselves, define their past, define
their future, define their goals and orient their future leaders’ (Fishman,
1985: 373). Education ‘enables a large number of people to learn, simul-
taneously, which ethnic group they belong to and what are the cultural
characteristics of that group’ (Eriksen, 1993: 91). Similarly, Bourdieu
argues, the education system primarily performs the: ‘function of conserv-
ing, inculcating and consecrating a cultural heritage. This is its “internal”
and most “essential function”’ (cited in Swartz, 1997: 190–1).
In the context of Tatarstan, new national gymnásias are the response and
alternative to 70 years of the Soviet regime, and to all the previous policies
of Russification. They are also a form of adaptation by the Tatar elite to the
new configuration of power relationships between the main ethnic group-
ings in Tatarstan and the balance of power between the republic and
Moscow. The response is a form of a revival of a distinct Tatar identity and
culture with some aspects of exclusivity and ‘uniqueness’ coexisting with
pragmatic adaptation to the demands of a bi-cultural society.
Jadidism, an Islamic reform movement that was influential at the end of
the 19th century, demanded a more modern education, and considered the
native language to be indispensable as the language of instruction, but with
Russian as a compulsory subject. The first Tatar gymnásia (F. Aitovoi)
opened in Kazan in 1916. It was a model for elite national education, and
in many respects the model has survived in the concept of the contempor-
ary Tatar school as a secular centre focused on national education, giving
high priority to Tatar language, literature and Tatar history, with all subjects
taught though the medium of Tatar (Ialalov, 1996). The school was closed
in 1918 shortly after the Bolshevik Revolution. The Soviet strategy then
focused on the aim of universal literacy – in the vernacular in primary
school education but increasingly in Russian at higher levels, including the
elite national schools. During the early 1930s, there was considerable
oscillation in schooling policies, but from that period to the beginning of the
1990s, national education was a very marginal option. Only Tatars and
Baskhirs had instruction in their own language for the entire duration of
their secondary education (Kaiser, 1994: 257) and such schools were more
common in rural areas than in the cities. By 1990, only one school remained
in the city of Kazan where children could study through the medium of
Tatar language (Lotfullin and Guryanova, 1996).
Today, the school system in Tatarstan, as in the rest of the Russian
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Federation, displays the same top-down structure that characterized the
Soviet educational regime. Article 4 of the Law of the Russian Federation
on Education specifies the secular nature of the state system of education.8
But in Tatarstan, as elsewhere in the Russian Federation, there are ‘new
type’ or innovative centres, including gymnásias defined by particular
subject specialities, language or ethnicity. The main difference between
gymnásias and other schools is the level of specialization. The gymnásia
curriculum has prestige and elite associations – historically because of its
high standards and level of specialization, and also because of the close
connection between these schools and a specific social class, the intelli-
gentsia.
In the early 1990s, with the burgeoning cultural-national movement, the
meaning of ‘national’ schooling changed significantly. The previous concept
of the national school as a place for a standard education delivered through
a language other than Russian was overtaken by the idea of a new type of
elite national educational centre, the Tatar gymnásia. These new schools
were perceived as a potential vehicle for Tatar culture and language
development, and the political elite began to pay close attention to the
issue. The number of Tatar gymnásias grew considerably during the 1990s.
In 1998 in Kazan, a city of over one million inhabitants, there were 189
schools, including 36 centres of the ‘new type’ with Tatar as a medium for
teaching (Ponomareva and Platonova, 1998). In practice, the Tatar
gymnásias are dedicated to monocultural and monoethnic transmission,
echoing the institutions created during earlier stages of Tatar cultural
revival. Their clear objective is to provide education based on national
ethnic culture, and popular traditions.
According to Ialalov there are three main features that define Tatar
gymnásias. First, they aim to guarantee a national orientation, national
consciousness and patriotism. Second, they involve strategies for individual
development and self-realization. And third, they aim to educate young
people in the musical, artistic and aesthetic values of the national culture
(1996: 13–4). In practice, the gymnásias are effective instruments for Tatar
culture and language revival because of the strong encouragement and
support they receive from the political elite, which is openly expressed. In
the words of the then Minister of Education:
Nowadays, national schooling appears as a key factor in any people’s national
rebirth. Only schooling can guarantee the opportunity for national cultural
development. It makes it [national culture] accessible to each person, modulates
people’s identity as a carrier and transmitter of their traditions, and also
transmits general human cultural – egalitarian values. (Kharisov, 1997: 79)
In official post-Soviet definitions, national schools are presented as schools
for dialogue, meeting points of culture, which educate pupils in and
reinforce national and ethno-cultural tolerance (Vestnik Obrazovaniia,
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1991: 26). This rhetoric of tolerance and cultural respect is not always
matched inside actual institutions, where discourses surrounding the
purpose of Tatar education dwell more on distinctiveness and difference
than multiethnic integration. For that reason, it would be a mistake to
analyse Tatar schooling in isolation, or to detach the elite schools from their
relationships to the Tatar political and economic elite, family influences, and
the agrobureaucracy from which they receive substantial support.
THE RESEARCH STRATEGY AND DATA
One of the most compelling reasons for the focus on elite Tatar schools is
the fact that, although they are not typical or representative of Tatarstan
generally, they are among the clearest manifestations of the processes of
Tatarization taking place in the republic. They are institutions specially
designed to create, or re-establish, reinforce and develop the Tatar national
culture and identities that only a small group of Tatar intellectuals and
artists could legitimately claim during the Soviet period. This research into
everyday interaction in education complements the work of historians,
political scientists and others who have examined the workings of the
‘Tatarstan model’ in government institutions.
The research took place over three years, beginning as a pilot study
conducted in Kazan between September 1997 and April 1998. Most issues
of access via gatekeepers such as head teachers were negotiated during this
first phase. Three further periods of fieldwork, using observation, interviews
with experts, teachers, headmistresses, parents and pupils, and documentary
sources followed: from March–June 1999; October–December 1999; and
August–September 2000. This was based on 57 unstructured interviews
(additional to 14 interviews from the pilot study) conducted in Russian.9
Data were collected from two different types of institutions, Tatar and non-
Tatar gymnásias (Alvarez Veinguer, 2002). Two Tatar schools in Kazan
(numbers 2 and 16) are described in the present account. The parallel
research in the non-Tatar schools provides data for a more general
interpretation of processes of ‘de-Sovietization’ and diversity in the school
system. The non-Tatar schools allow much less room for Tatar culture and
traditions – even when nearly half of the pupils come from Tatar ethnic
backgrounds. Therefore, despite their rapid growth since 1991, it is import-
ant to emphasize that the Tatar gymnásias represent a small proportion of
the whole spectrum of secondary education, and they can even be
considered a ‘special option’, because only certain children can access them.
The justification for focusing on this type of school is their clarity of purpose
and social significance in terms of the ‘national’ project. A remarkably rigid
and essentialist interpretation of Tatar language exists within the Tatar
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gymnásias among pupils, teachers and parents. It is the ultimate defining
characteristic of the Tatar nation and people (natsiia), umbilically attached
to the assumed ‘givens’ of territory, ethos, kinship, religious community and
particular social practices (Geertz, 1996: 41). Recovery and revival of the
Tatar language is presented as one of the main priorities by teachers,
parents and pupils alike. Its renewal would allow Tatars to transform and
(re-)formulate their relation with their Russian neighbours and, in particu-
lar, with the federal centre, Moscow.
The research entailed an in-depth, extended exploration of processes of
identity construction, or ‘identization’ in the school environment.10 The
focus is not simply on language issues, but on difference, the meanings of
otherness, living in a multiethnic society, religiosity and family and
marriage, and patriotism. The method is ethnographic, reflecting the study’s
emphasis on the process of schooling, interaction between teachers, pupils
and parents, and the discursive construction of Tatar (and Russian) belong-
ing. Formal aspects of curriculum planning, language policy or pedagogical
technique are included as background to the main body of data, which
comes from a variety of sources: observation of classes, extra-curricular
activities and informal interaction in the school setting; open-ended
interviews with pupils, parents and teachers; informal conversations
individually and in groups with these participants; and more formal, semi-
structured interviews with experts. The approach is therefore qualitative
with a strong emphasis on the intersubjective positioning of the researcher
as a ‘semi-insider’ in the research relationship. The field researcher had the
advantage of being both an ‘insider’ with Russian education and fluent
Russian language, and an ‘outsider’ from western Europe.11 The data are
interpreted as the multidimensional expression of political discourse, insti-
tutional practice and everyday meanings, not bound by predetermined
categories.
TATAR CULTURAL TRANSMISSION: DISTINCTIVE IDENTIT Y
AND EXCLUSIVIT Y
Gymnásia No. 2, Moskovskii raion (district)
This is a well-known and prestigious Tatar gymnásia in Kazan. The school
has 700 pupils and 30 classes with 20 or 21 pupils in each. The majority of
pupils and teachers are Tatars.12 A visitor to the school encounters a hive
of activity, especially near the headmistress’s office, since there is a
constant stream of events, seminars, conferences, guests from other cities,
local and foreign journalists, exhibitions and diverse performances.
Gymnásia No. 2 represents a model of the Tatar gymnásia for the entire
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republic. It is a well-established institution with a tradition of 40 years’
working only with Tatar children. Before 1990, the school was a Tatar
orphanage, the only place in the city where most of the education was in
Tatar and where children came from all over Tatarstan. As more than one
teacher claimed, ‘we always had a Tatar spirit here’. In 1990, it was re-
opened as a Tatar gymnásia. Tatar is used as the medium for teaching in
the school and Tatar cultural transmission is one of the main objectives.
The headmistress confirmed that ‘the objective of our school is the re-birth
and development of national education, to educate within these walls a
national intelligentsia’.13
The curriculum is based on ‘classical education’, which is adapted in
specific ways to the circumstances. For example, instead of logic, students
study chess twice per week as a compulsory subject, not a hobby or a
voluntary workshop. As a substitute for Latin, they study Arabic (three
hours per week) because, as the headmistress stressed, all their spiritual
wealth is in Arabic. In addition to Tatar and Russian languages they also
have five hours a week of English from the first school year, and Turkish
as an optional language from the fifth to the eleventh school year, plus
ballroom dancing, Tatar craft workshops and Tatar wrestling. Apart from
the multitude of events that take place in the school, the headmistress also
organizes a variety of extra-curricular events, including numerous seminars
and conferences. She is a key figure, in her individual as well as insti-
tutional capacity, in the process of national education revival in the
republic, and she is a strong and enthusiastic promoter of the project. The
prevailing language in school is Tatar although some conversations in
Russian can be heard among pupils when out of the teachers’ earshot. Many
pupils will admit that they prefer to speak Russian with their classmates
because they feel more comfortable when talking about such topics as
television or reading.
Gymnásia No. 16, Privolskii raion (district)
The first research visit to the school took place in 1998 when staff were
preparing everything for 1 September, the official day for the inauguration
of the centre. From the architectural point of view, the new and ostentatious
building (inside and out) conforms to traditional Tatar canons, the Arabic
style with domes, arches and minaret-like towers. It contrasts sharply with
the monolithic blocks of the Soviet type that dominate the school architec-
ture in Kazan. It is decorated with marble and stylish furnishing, such as
sofas and decorative elements that are usually quite absent in other schools,
where the Soviet austere style still predominates. School No. 16 benefits
from very good equipment, including a swimming pool, two sports centres,
a dance studio, a sound laboratory, two computer rooms, two language
laboratories, and a very large canteen. Classrooms are spacious, each
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designed for only 20 pupils, or a maximum of 25. Generally, in other schools,
classrooms are for 30 to 35 or, occasionally, even more pupils. The school
has 600 pupils (from all districts), but from its scale, one would expect it to
house a much larger number.
According to the headmistress, there are enough specialists to teach all
the subjects in Tatar, apart from computing and Russian language and
literature, (which are in Russian); and they dedicate the same number of
hours (six per week) to Tatar and Russian language and literature (as in
gymnásia 2). They study English from the second school year, and after the
fifth year they have a second foreign language; Arabic or Turkish. However,
they were forced to stop these classes because teachers were not available.
This gymnásia, according to the headmistress, is:
for all Tatar parents who want their children to study in a national school, and
we select the most qualified pupils. We organize a special committee including a
psychologist and different professionals, musicians, dancing teachers, and
drawing teachers, amongst others.
The implicit message in these words is that the school is not only for ‘the
best pupils’ but for ‘the best Tatar pupils’. According to the research inter-
views and observation, all the pupils are Tatars, but Russian pupils could in
theory be accepted if their parents wanted them to study in Tatar.
According to the headmistress, the gymnásia’s main goal is to combine
general academic knowledge and national education, which she claims is
the perfect combination; all the courses and workshops are focused on
national content:
We don’t want our school to be just a normal school, we want it to be a centre
for our leaders, Tatar leaders, dedicated to Tatar culture, poets, writers [. . .]
these things that somehow were lost during Soviet times. There are so many
Russian schools in Kazan, and we have to equal this number, and our parents
want their children to study in our schools, without fear, knowing that one day
they will go to the university. They will manage to find their way and they will
not be afraid; everything will be in their mother tongue. There is a future for
Tatar people. We want to transmit our national spirit, so when people come to
the school they will feel that this is a Tatar school.
In both schools, there were constant references to the significance of the
mother tongue. It represented the clearest boundary marker in teachers’
and pupils’ representations of ‘others’ and in the construction of collec-
tive identities. Other markers are less distinct. Muslim religion, for
example, typically understood in terms of historical tradition, is taken for
granted as part of being Tatar but is less closely connected with the
everyday life of the respondents.14 Further analysis of the position of
Tatar language will highlight the significance of language in the school
setting.
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AT TITUDES TO THE TATAR LANGUAGE: REINFORCING
‘PRIMORDIAL TIES’
What attitudes do Tatar gymnásia pupils have to the Tatar language and
what does the Tatar language mean to them? The father of a male pupil
explained that he chose a Tatar gymnásia (in this case No. 16) for his son
because they are Tatar. He did not want him to go to a Russian school
because they do not teach the Tatar language there, and he would forget
everything he knew ‘because they promote the Russian language and
Christian propaganda’. His son says:
. . . in here we are all Tatars together, it is possible to say that [. . .] here
somehow we can talk about Russians with our Tatars, yes, because if there were
Russian children in our group, we would not speak to them in a direct way.
Generally about Russian natsiia or Tatar natsiia and we feel more free here, in
this environment. But . . . there is no discrimination towards the people, because
we are in Tatarstan and we are all at the same level, Russians and Tatars. It is
just, I suppose, my parents wanted me to study and . . . to learn to speak in my
mother tongue. (Male pupil, 15 years old)
He added: ‘but also because the teachers are Tatars and they have a closer
relationship with us, you can say that they are concerned about us’. This
pupil gives a very clear explanation of why he likes the school, not just
because it is one of the best equipped schools in Kazan or because of his
friends, or the teachers. The reasons are simpler and yet more subtle. The
fundamental attraction is that they are all Tatars. He feels at ease inside his
clan, free to talk about the ‘others’ and to define himself. He justifies himself
saying that there is no discrimination, but there is a desire for segregation.
He implies that Russian teachers do not care about Tatar pupils, or Tatar
teachers do not look after Russian pupils. With little hesitation he expresses
what he thinks, which in all likelihood corresponds to what his parents and
teachers think: that Tatar people are much better off amongst Tatars. He
may be unaware of the implications of what he is saying about the absence
of discrimination, nevertheless he prefers to study with Tatar people and
Tatar teachers because he feels secure.
One of the Tatar history teachers, who had been working in gymnásia No.
2 from the first day it opened, recalled that the first group of pupils came
from a very specific social stratum. They were the children of the intelli-
gentsia, such as teachers and doctors, people devoted to a cultural tradition.
They were among the first to make the effort because they understood that
it was impossible for a renaissance to occur if the children could not speak
the language. More broadly based efforts to bring about a language shift
had encountered serious problems. According to sociological research
conducted in Kazan in 1998,15 the heavy investment of organizational,
political and professional resources in Tatar language teaching across the
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school system in the previous five years had not resulted in a significant shift
towards bilingualism; Russian-speaking pupils were not starting to use
Tatar. The research offers various explanations for this failure, but they are
primarily connected with problems with the level of professionalism and
teaching methods on the one hand, and the influence of more general social
factors on the other, which combined to slow down the process. The
research shows that the serious lack of Tatar language specialists in schools
means that non-specialists often have to take classes, leading to lower
standards. However, there is further evidence that there is a problem with
attitudes to learning the Tatar language, a certain lack of respect or toler-
ance towards other languages and cultures.16 The approach to the Tatar
language is quite different, depending on whether pupils come from a Tatar
or a non-Tatar gymnásia. In non-Tatar schools, there is evidence of an
instrumental approach towards Tatar language learning. In Tatar gymnásias,
both pupils and teachers express the ‘primordial’ quality of their ties to the
language and therefore to their collective identity.
These distinctions between instrumental, symbolic and ‘elemental’ types
of connection between language and ethnicity are found in other contexts
of ethnic and national revival in the post-Soviet sphere, including the
Baltic republics and regions of the Russian Federation. Latvia, for
example, a newly independent state in 1991, reversed the policy of the
Soviet era and privileged Latvian as the national language. According to
Björklund (2004) the country’s post-communist policy is a mirror image of
the national politics of the Soviet period. In their report on a survey of
language attitudes among Estonian school pupils, Ehala and Niglas (2006)
argue that while the link between language and identity is strong, it now
has to be understood in terms of a linguistic economy at the global as well
as national level. A study of the Buryat minority in the Russian far east
suggests a pattern of integration with the Russian majority in which the
Buryat language is losing significance except as a cultural marker, although
the loss of the language does not threaten the ethnic identity itself
(Khilkhanova and Khilkhanov, 2004). As Spolsky suggests, such variety of
patterns comes about because language policy is shaped in several ways:
by everyday practices and language choices; by general beliefs about
language; its social and political significance; and by deliberate interven-
tions such as educational strategies (2004: 5). Language policy in Tatarstan
as a whole is too complex to fit comfortably with either the explanation
of a nation-state building strategy or educational policies to revitalize a
minority language in decline (Paulston and Heidemann, 2006). The Tatar
schools, however, embody aspects of both in circumstances that reflect
broader political as well as cultural imperatives. Language in this insti-
tutional context is the ‘central source and marker of peoplehood’
(Macdonald, 1997: 219). Particularly in circumstances of transition and
economic instability, or periods of political and social insecurity, language
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becomes a symbol of cohesion, an indicator of heritage and roots, a
symbolic and political force allowing people to proclaim their belonging to
a certain group. This is clearly expressed in the institutional and everyday
discourses of the Tatar gymnásias. It is confirmed by Iskhakov’s17 work in
relation to the question why people considered themselves to be Tatar. He
found that language usually appeared as one of the strongest indicators of
identity. However, Sagitova18 observed that ‘family tradition’ is also import-
ant because respondents typically say in response to the question why they
consider themselves to be Tatar: ‘if my parents are Tatars, so am I’ or ‘it is
a matter of tradition’. Within Tatar schools, language is the main symbol of
the tradition.
The Tatar language revival in Tatarstan can be seen as an awakening
from the ‘long sleep’ of the period of Russification. The transformation is
palpable, allowing people to observe and gauge its progress and the
development of Tatar communication in different spheres of everyday life,
from schools to mass media, and from shops to the workplace. During the
fieldwork in both of the Tatar gymnásias, there was an observable tendency
among pupils and teachers to repeat and combine certain sets of words.
References to Tatar language, history, traditions, past and culture, were
continuously prefaced by the possessive adjective ‘our’, suggesting a
uniform self- and collective identity. Similarly, the notion of language is
commonly associated with a notion of natsiia, where the language is the
most essential defining feature. Therefore if you live in Tatarstan, you are
supposed to speak Tatar, because people, place and language are insepara-
ble, echoing Kaiser’s statement that language is ‘one of the most important
objective characteristics of the nation’ (1994: 253). Ideas of the union
between the Tatar language and Tatar culture, identity and history, are also
shared by the Tatar nationalist movements, although these movements are
not synonymous with the more general renaissance. Language revival was
one of the main demands made by TOTS (The Tatar Public Centre, created
in 1988, representing a national front, involved in political and cultural
areas) and Itiffak (the nationalist party) to the government as the key
element of the ethno-cultural renewal process.
The romantic nationalism discourse does not preclude some recognition
of the instrumental value of the language. A father explained:
I am Tatar by natsional’nost [. . .] and nowadays there is a demand in society to
know your mother tongue. And I would like our son to know Tatar better than I
do, so he will be able to speak, to read, he will not be determined enough, this is
the main reason. And in the future, politics . . . to lead the republic, the Ministry
of Education is working in that direction, they are developing national cadres.
The idea is presented in terms of a simple logic. This parent anticipates that
knowledge of Tatar language will bring access to the political arena, not to
any specific administrative position, but to the national elite.
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Tatar language will become the most important language, and all Russians will
be able to speak Tatar. Since we live in Tatarstan, we already speak Russian, and
they live in Tatarstan, but they cannot speak Tatar, why is that? If they are living
in our country! (Female pupil, 15 years old)
Pupils and teachers in fact accept the importance of Russian, and this pupil
was neither trying to downgrade the importance of the Russian language,
nor to defend a monolingual society. It is more a question of the Russian
speaking population’s attitude to the Tatar language, the evident lack of
respect towards the language or lack of interest in learning it. In response
to the question whether she noticed that the Russian population was begin-
ning to speak Tatar, her immediate reaction was a spontaneous laugh with
a categorical: ‘Nyet’ (‘no’).
They study it, but they do not speak it, I have never heard a Russian speaking
Tatar. Every time that we meet with them, with Russian friends, and I like them
very much indeed, we always speak Russian.
In Tatar gymnásias, the Tatar language prevails as the medium of instruc-
tion, even though some Russian is heard in conversation. In contrast, there
are no signs of Tatar language in non-Tatar gymnásias, except when it is
taught as a second language. According to Mingazovna19 (a specialist in
national education in the Ministry of Education), currently around 97
percent of the students in the Republic of Tatarstan study Tatar; evidence
of the recent ‘boom’ in the Tatar language. It is certainly a notable achieve-
ment that Russian pupils are studying Tatar, and what is even more signifi-
cant, that they comprehend at least formally the importance and the
relevance of learning the language. It would have been unthinkable before
the collapse of the Soviet Union. However, pupils and teachers from non-
Tatar schools would never assume equal status for the Russian and Tatar
languages.
But currently . . . we have to learn Tatar language, the result is that they are
forcing us, because I think if a person wants to study Tatar – they can do it- but
if they don’t want to, they should not have to study it. We are having some
difficulties with it. I think Russians at least should not take the exams. [. . .] I
don’t think that everyone needs it. The ones who want – they can study it, and
the ones who don’t . . . Tatars, if they are Tatars, they should know their
vernacular, but not to put pressure to such a degree. Because now, apart from
Tatar language and Tatar literature, Tatar history is also introduced, and
Tatarstan geography. But perhaps it is necessary to know the history, but not to
the extent we have to.’ (Female pupil, 15 years old)
For non-Tatar gymnásias’ pupils and teachers, Tatar language is an ‘exotic’
subject of minor importance. Discontent arises from the compulsion, the
number of hours that pupils have to dedicate to it and the shortage of
qualified teachers. Some teachers see it as damaging to the rest of the
curriculum.
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Yes, they don’t like it. The younger children – are attending through obligation,
but older children . . . are disappointed, they say: why do they give us so many
hours of Tatar? [. . .] The Tatar language isn’t a working language yet. Mainly,
the ones who know the Tatar language, are the people who learned it at home,
and spoke Tatar from their childhood- of course they have a higher level of
knowledge. But in general it is not a working language, it is a Russian-speaking
population, and all Tatars belong to a Russian-speaking population, Ukrainians,
Jews and people from other natsional’nosti – they are all Russian speaking.
(Russian language and literature teacher from a non-Tatar gymnásia)
There is little interest in questioning or recognizing the asymmetrical
relationship between the two languages. The Russian-speaking population
has no incentive to learn Tatar as an alternative medium for everyday inter-
action, to find a job, or shop in a supermarket. This is the meaning of
‘working language’ in the above quote – a language that people have to use.
Popular culture and the media provide no incentive for Tatar language and
cultural development, and in most cases pupils prefer Russian programmes
(television and radio) as well as Russian magazines. Many see English as
the obvious choice for a second language.
[. . .] And because there are two official languages it doesn’t mean that they will
need the Tatar language, and from my point of view it is necessary to dedicate
more attention to English, preferably to English, than to Tatar.’ (History teacher
from non-Tatar gymnásia)
According to Baker (1992), attitudes to learning a second language reflect
the combination of individual needs and social situations, and acceptance
may occur when the social, economic and political environment is positive.
Tatarstan has in place some of the requirements for legitimation of the Tatar
language, namely official recognition and institutionalization in certain
domains (May, 2001: 152). However, it is crucial how public support is
encouraged, since the opposite effect can result. One of the main difficulties
for the Tatar language is the inherent contradiction between its formal
(bureaucratic) and informal (everyday) position, what Iskhakova describes
as the distinction between juridical status and real functioning (1999: 157).
Tatar continues to under-perform in its official position, because Russian is
the dominant language in daily use.
That bilingualism is not a two-way process is amply confirmed by the
research. Whereas most urban Tatars speak Russian, almost none of the
urban Russians speak Tatar. According to the census of 1989, virtually all
city-dwelling Tatars knew Russian and so did about two-thirds of the Tatars
in the countryside. In contrast to this, less than 2 percent of the Russian
rural population indicated that they knew Tatar (Kondrashov, 2000: 37). The
subsequent development of compulsory instruction in schools, new Tatar
media, and use in government institutions has generated awareness of
linguistic diversity among the general population. However, a side effect of
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the specialized education is to sharpen the differences between languages,
between ethnic groups and within ethnic groups (for example, Tatars with
and without the Tatar language).
In the particular environment of schools No. 2 and No. 16, the Tatar
language is not only a medium for study or communication, or even a
language that will help to bring success in a career. It is not synonymous
with sophistication, or access to high technology, computers or the Internet.
On the contrary, the significance of the language is strongly related to the
past, proving a connection with ancestors, roots, the mother tongue. It is a
key to how ‘Tatarhood’ is represented in the past, present and the future.
For some of the generation of girls and boys from urbanized backgrounds
currently studying in Tatar gymnásias, it is a difficult task to overcome the
parental ‘deficit’ caused by the lack of opportunity for their parents to learn
their vernacular. At the present time, there is still a high level of uncertainty
and unpredictability in attitudes to language, and the mother of a female
pupil knows that things can easily change again. They have grown accus-
tomed to the instability and have learned to keep their options open
because they cannot take the risk of renouncing the Russian language:
Of course what worries me is the unstable political situation, and whether
pupils, when they graduate from this gymnasia, will find their way in this life, if
they will be able to receive higher education and if they will be in demand. This
is what really worries me. (Mother of a female pupil)
Tatar gymnásias are not only relatively new centres, they are also places of
innovation that depend heavily on elite sponsorship and the character of
the political relationship between the republic and the central government.
Since the end of the Yeltsin period, Tatarstan has steered a difficult path
between limited sovereignty and the re-centralizing tendencies of the Putin
presidency. Language and educational strategies reflect this ongoing
process.
Two examples of language policy illustrate this: the proposed return to
the Latin alphabet and the debate concerning a Tatar University, which
would teach all subjects through the medium of Tatar. In 1999, Tatarstan
attempted to re-introduce the Latin alphabet for Tatar on the grounds that
it is better suited to modern needs and because it is more suitable for
transliteration than Cyrillic. Pilot projects began in some schools. However,
federal authorities saw it as an excess of Tatarization and in 2004 the
Russian Federation Constitutional Court overruled the Tatarstan law,
denying republics the right to establish alphabets for national languages
(Tatar-Inform, 2004). The Tatar University represents an important
ambition for some of the Tatar population – not just for some sectors of the
political elite and nationalist groups, but also for the teachers, parents and
pupils from Tatar gymnásias. For them it would represent continuity with
their work, demonstrate that the Tatar language situation is changing, and
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that their efforts are generating results. The actual outcome of the project
illustrates the important role of the federal authorities, the Tatarstan presi-
dency and other interests in shaping a compromise. In time for the start of
the 2005–06 academic year, President Shaimiev was instrumental in
bringing about a merger between the institutions in Kazan that had been
the main carriers of the Tatar ideal for higher education: the federally
funded Kazan State Pedagogical University, TARI (the non-governmental
Tatar-American Regional Institute) and the small Tatar State Institute for
Humanities. The latter specialized in economics, law and foreign languages,
with Russian as the main medium of instruction. The new institution,
housed in a new building in the centre of Kazan, is called the ‘Tatar State
Humanities-Pedagogical University’. Its financial viability is secured by
core funding from the federal government, signalling an inclination from
Moscow to establish stable relations with the Tatar language and culture.
However, it will not be an exclusively Tatar-medium institution. To the
dismay of some nationalists, the potential symbolic power of the university
has been diminished through this compromise (Machneva, 2005).
CONCLUSION
Schools, in consort with other institutions, create and reproduce concrete
and specific symbols, a cultural representation that simultaneously
reinforces a sense of ‘belonging’ and ‘communality’, as well as ‘otherness’
and ‘differentiation’. There is a direct connection between Tatar gymnásias
and some sectors of the Tatar political elite, articulated through an intra-
elite process, mutually and dynamically reinforced by everyday life in
families and schools. The research shows that there is close correspondence
between attitudes at home and school. Pupils in the 14–16 age group repeat
what they hear in school and accept without much hesitation what the
adults claim. There is no evidence of the subcultures of ‘resistance’
described in many studies of schooling elsewhere. According to Tatar
culture, the voice of the elders has to be listened to and accepted, and this
may help to explain why the correspondence appears to be closer than in
other settings. Pupils hear, accept and reproduce what are portrayed as the
advantages of ethno-cultural segregation. They uphold the belief in Tatar
language primordiality, the need to reinforce and maintain monocultural
environments (including Tatar schools), and marriage only within the group
(Tatar endogamy), as mechanisms to ensure group cohesion and the
survival of Tatar culture.
Tatar language was the priority topic of concern inside both Tatar
gymnásias during the period when this research was conducted. The
evidence confirms Schöpflin’s observation that the role of language as an
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ethnic marker has been especially salient in central and eastern Europe
(2000: 118) and, by extension, the former Soviet Union. It illustrates the
Hungarian writer Gyula Illyés’ saying that ‘the nation lives in its language’
(quoted in Schöpflin 2000: 120). In these countries, the view of language as
‘primordial’ is still widely accepted as the strongest source of attachment to
a community, a group or a nation, and to its national symbols (songs, stories
and anthems) because these representations are transmitted through
language. The language is the mechanism to protect and keep them alive.
‘Ethnicity may not be related to language, whereas language as a boundary
marker is always related to ethnicity’ (Haarmann 1986: 261). Language, not
religion or ethnicity, was the epicentre of the discourses reproduced in the
school settings. Its importance is underlined by the visible changes taking
place in the republic involving the Tatar language. For pupils and teachers
it was the clearest marker of the boundaries between the idea of ‘ourselves’
and ‘others’.
However, differences between Tatars and non-Tatars in attitudes to the
language, different readings of history, and differences in representing the
‘other’, cannot be understood in terms of interaction between ethno-
cultural or national groups without reference to institutional strategies.
They play an explicit role in reinforcing and promoting specific attitudes
and representations. The research revealed the strength of the essentialist
interpretation of the Tatar language inside the Tatar gymnásias. This
contrasts with non-Tatar gymnásias, where the fact that Tatar language is
also an official language in the republic is tolerated without much enthusi-
asm, and indeed with some hostility, because of the number of hours, poor
organization and inadequately trained teachers. One side of the coin repre-
sents hope, anticipation and illusion; the other represents very desultory
interest and absence of curiosity about Tatar language or Tatar culture. The
lack of respect and attention is a matter of increasing concern for the future
if the objective is to build an egalitarian society, and if the various mechan-
isms and structures needed to bring about a change in pupils’ and teachers’
attitudes are to work successfully. The fact that bilingualism appears as a
one-way process historically (and currently, as this research illustrates)
reinforces feelings of injustice, unfairness, inequality, cultural domination
and discrimination. What some sectors of the population see as just the
beginning of a Tatar cultural and linguistic revival is, for others, an unbal-
anced and asymmetrical national policy.
Tatar gymnásias epitomize resistance to the decline of the Tatar language
and culture. They are places where pupils can learn about the history of
Tatarstan and its traditions, learn Arabic and become familiar with Islam.
They provide spaces where patriotism for Tatarstan is accentuated, an
environment where new narratives of the Tatar people are in a state of
effervescence and where a primordial understanding of ‘Tatarhood’ is in an
advanced stage of elaboration. On the other hand, inside non-Tatar
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gymnásias,Tatar culture and traditions are relegated to a marginal position,
and English and French are the two main languages that pupils prefer to
learn. Tatarization is a response to centuries of cultural attrition within the
Russian and Soviet empires that could have resulted in a complete loss of
identity. While the policies of Russification and Sovietization leading to
marginalization have not ceased to have an effect, bit by bit they are being
unravelled. How Tatar education will develop will depend on global influ-
ences, the fate of the ‘Tatarstan model’ and policies in Moscow, as well as
what happens within the republic. At this time it is difficult to say where the
processes of ethnic and national categorization, discursive frames and insti-
tutional projects will lead. The current emphasis is on cohabitation between
the two main groups, Tatars and Russians. In the prevailing climate, there
is general agreement that peaceful cohabitation is possible. It is difficult to
imagine in the context of Tatarstan a violent conflict or nationalist explo-
sion, since the relationship between the main population groups is based on
a practical attempt to find a consensus. However, the example of Tatar
schooling shows that this consensus is not yet grounded in a shared under-
standing of language, ethnicity or cultural diversity.
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Notes
1 Enacted on 30 November 1992. Full version available at http://www.tatar.ru.
2 For a full account see Alvarez Veinguer (2002).
3 On the ‘Tatarstan Model’ see Drobizheva, 1997 and Iskhakov, 1997b, especially
pp. 123–53.
4 The population of Tatarstan is 3.8 million, approximately half of whom are
Tatars. In Kazan, the site of this study, the main ethnic groups in 2001 were Tatar
(51.3%), Russian (41%) and Chuvash (about 3%). See the official website of
the Republic of Tatarstan: http://www.tatar.ru.
5 Lilia Varisovna Sagitova (Senior Researcher in ethnology at the Institute of
History of Tatarstan) showed that 78.1 percent of the political elite are Tatars
(Sagitova, 1998). Löwenhardt (1997) indicated that by 1995 only 20 percent of
the chiefs of administration of the districts and cities and 25 percent of the
Chairmen of District Soviets were ethnic Russians. Matsuzato (2001) describes
the regime as ‘centralized caciquismo’, involving strong personal influences and
state institutions that resemble those of the Soviet period.
6 Literally translated from Russian. Interview with Mukhariamov, Nial’
Midkhatovich, Doctor of Politics, Dean and Head of the Department of Social
Sciences, Kazan University of Energy, 15 September 2000.
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7 A gymnásia was a secondary school of highest grade preparing for universities
in pre-Revolutionary Russia. In Russian, the ‘national’ in national education
(natsional’noe obrazovanie) is understood to refer primarily to ethnicity.
8 Principles of State Policy in the Sphere of Education (Eklof and Dneprov, 1993).
9 All interviews were recorded and transcribed. In the Tatar gymnasias, the
sample consisted of six teachers, 14 pupils (aged 14–16 years) and three parents.
In the non-Tatar gymnasias, six teachers and 21 pupils were interviewed. Seven
Headmistresses from different gymnasias were also interviewed, and the 13
experts included the Minister of Education and the State Adviser to the
President on Political Affairs.
10 The notion of identization emphasizes the idea that identities are always in
movement (Melucci, 1996), and invariably involve ‘a process in process’. It is a
way of thinking beyond categorical group identities (Brubaker, 2004, Ch. 2).
11 Not all Tatars would feel as comfortable talking to a Russian researcher as to a
western researcher, but fluency in language is essential for collecting good
quality data. The in-between role of the researcher allowed respondents to
position themselves in relation to the ‘participant’ or ‘stranger’ as they chose.
For reasons of time, the researcher did not undertake to learn Tatar. It was not
essential for data collection as all respondents spoke fluent Russian and
documents are generally available in Russian.
12 It is interesting to note that the headmistress made a strong point of the
fact that five or six pupils come from mixed families, where only one of the
parents is Tatar, and that some pupils are from converted (Kryashen) Tatar
backgrounds.
13 Interview, 23 November 1998.
14 According to Rafael Khakimov (2004) ‘polls show that over 80 percent of the
Tatar youth consider themselves Muslim, but only 2 percent attend mosque at
least once a week, and 4 percent attend just once a month’.
15 Tatarskii iazyk v shkolakh RT v konteskte sovremennykh sotsial’no-
obrazovatel’nykh tendentsii: sostoianie, problemy, perspektivy. Kazan’ 1998:
Ministerstvo Obrazovaniia RT. Laboratoriia sotsiologicheskikh issledovanii
IPKRO RT (Tatar language in schools of RT through current context of social
– educational tendencies: conditions, problems, perspectives. Kazan. 1998.
Ministry of Education of RT. Laboratory of Sociological Research RT).
Although the research was sponsored by the Ministry, the results are consistent
with the findings of other studies (e.g. Yerofeyev and Nizamova, 2001) and the
results presented here.
16 According to research in other contexts, the general acceptability or ‘tolerabil-
ity’ of the minority language by majority language speakers is essential to
overcome marginalization (Grin, 1995 cited in May, 2001: 14).
17 Iskhakov, Damir Mavliaveevich, Doctor of History, researcher in the ethnology
department of the Institute of History, Tatarstan Academy of Sciences, Head of
the Center of Ethnological Monitoring. Interview, 17 March 1998.
18 Interview, March 1998.
19 Interview, 4 February 1998.
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